

Progress Report on Resource Certification

February 2007



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APNIC

Objective

- To create a robust framework that allows validation of assertions relating to IP addresses and ASNs and their use

and

- To make it easier for anyone to see if someone is lying about actual control over addresses and/or routing!

Uses

- Signing of IRR entries

“Yes, I am the right-of-use holder and that’s *precisely* the information I entered into the IRR.”
- Signing of Routing Origination

“Yes, I am the right-of-use holder for this address prefix and I am permitting ASx to originate a route to this address prefix.”
- Signing of Route Requests

“Please route address prefix a.b.c.d/x through customer interface xxx.”

Resources for this work

- APNIC's allocation database
- Public / Private key technology
- X.509 v3 certificate technology
- IP resource extensions to X.509 v3 certificates
- PKI models and trust relationships


The Overall Objective



- To support a PKI that mirrors the existing resource allocation state
 - Every resource allocation can be attested by a matching certificate that binds the allocated resource with the resource issuer and recipient
- To use these resource certificates to make signed assertions that can be validated through this PKI


Resource Certificates

Resource
Allocation
Hierarchy




Resource Certificates

Resource
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


**Issued Certificates match
allocation actions**




Resource Certificates

Resource Allocation Hierarchy



Resource Certificates

Resource
Allocation
Hierarchy




Issued Certificates

Issuer: APNIC
 Subject: NIR2
 Resources: 192.2.0.0/16
 Key Info: <nir2-key-pub>
 Signed: <apnic-key-priv>

Issuer: NIR2
 Subject: ISP4
 Resources: 192.2.200.0/24
 Key Info: <isp4-key-pub>
 Signed: <nir2-key-priv>


Resource Certificates

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


Use: Routing Authority

Resource
Allocation
Hierarchy




Issued Certificates



Route Origination Authority
 “ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

Signed Objects

Resource
Allocation
Hierarchy




Issued Certificates


Route Origination Authority
 “ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed,
 ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>



Signed Object Validation



Route Origination Authority
 “ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>


Signed,
 ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>



1. Did the matching private key sign this text?

Signed Object Validation

Resource
Allocation
Hierarchy




Route Origination Authority
 “ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”

Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed,
 ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>

2. Is this certificate valid?

Signed Object Validation



Route Origination Authority
 "ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24"


Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed,
 ISP4 <isp4-ee-k

3. Is there a valid certificate path from a Trust Anchor to this certificate?

Signed Object Validation

Resource
Allocation
Hierarchy



Validation Outcomes

1. ISP4 authorized this Authority document
2. 192.2.200.0/24 is a **valid** address, derived from an APNIC allocation
3. ISP4 holds a current right-of-use of 192.2.200.0/24
4. A route object, where AS65000 originates an advertisement for the address prefix 192.2.200.0/24, has the explicit authority of ISP4, who is the current holder of this address prefix

Route Origination Authority
 “ISP4 permits AS65000 to originate a route for the prefix 192.2.200.0/24”



Attachment: <isp4-ee-cert>

Signed,
 ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv>



Example of a Signed Object

```
netnum-set: RS-TELSTRA-AU-EX1
descr: Example routes for customer with space under apnic
members: 58.160.1.0-58.160.16.255,203.34.33.0/24
tech-c: GM85-AP
admin-c: GM85-AP
notify: test@telstra.net
mnt-by: MAINT-AU-TELSTRA-AP
sigcert: rsync://repository.apnic.net/TELSTRA-AU-IANA/cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5
         Ck010p5Q/Hc4yxwhTamNXW-cDwtQcmv0VGjU.cer
sigblk: -----BEGIN PKCS7-----
        MIIBdQYJKoZIhvcNAQcCoIIBZjCCAWICAQExCzAJBgUrDgMCGGUAMAsGCSqGSIb3
        DQEhATGCAUEwggE9AgEBMBowFTETMBEGA1UEAxMKdGVsc3RyYS1hdQIBATAJBgUr
        DgMCGGUAMA0GCSqGSIb3DQEBAQUABIIBAEZGI2dAG31AAGi+mAK/S5bsNrgEH0mN
        11eJF9aqM+jVO+tiCvRHYPMeBMiP6yoCm2h5RCR/avP40U4CC3QMhU98tw2Bq0TY
        HZvqXfA0VhjD4Apx4KjiAyr8tfeC7ZDh0+fpvsydV2XXtHIvjjwL4GvM/gES6dJ
        KJYFWl rPqQnFTFMm5oLWBUhNjuX2E89qyQf2YZVizITTNg31y1nwqBoAqmmDhDy
        +nsRVAXax7II2iQDTr/pjI2VWfe4R36gbT8oxyvJ9xz7I9IKpB8RTvPV02I2HbMI
        1SvRXMx5nQOXyYG3Pcxo/PAhbBkVkgfudLki/IzB3j+4M8KemrnVMRo=
        -----END PKCS7-----
changed: test@telstra.net 20060822
source: APNIC
```



Signer's Resource Certificate

Version: 3
Serial: 1
Issuer: CN=telstra-au

Validity: Not Before: Fri Aug 18 04:46:18 2006 GMT
Validity: Not After: Sat Aug 18 04:46:18 2007 GMT

Subject: CN=An example sub-space from Telstra IANA, E=apnic-ca@apnic.net
Subject Key Identifier g(SKI): Hc4yxwhTamNXW-cDwtQcmvOVGjU
Subject Info Access: caRepository -
rsync://repository.apnic.net/TELSTRA-AU-IANA/cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5
Ck010p5Q/Hc4yxwhTamNXW-cDwtQcmvOVGjU

Key Usage: DigitalSignature, nonRepudiation
CRL Distribution Points:
rsync://repository.apnic.net/TELSTRA-AU-IANA/cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5
Ck010p5Q.crl

Authority Info Access: caIssuers -
rsync://repository.apnic.net/TELSTRA-AU-IANA/cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5
Ck010p5Q.cer

Authority Key Identifier:
Key Identifier g(AKI): cbh3Sk-iwj8Yd8uqaB5Ck010p5Q

Certificate Policies: 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.14.2

IPv4: 58.160.1.0-58.160.16.255, 203.34.33.0/24



Trial Activity Status



- ✓ Specification of X.509 Resource Certificates
- ✓ Generation of resource certificate repositories aligned with existing resource allocations and assignments
- ✓ Tools for Registration Authority / Certificate Authority interaction (undertaken by RIPE NCC)
- ✓ Tools to perform validation of resource certificates Extensions to OpenSSL for Resource Certificates (open source development activity, supported by ARIN)

Current Activities

- ★ Tools for resource collection management, object signing and signed object validation (APNIC, and also open source development activity, supported by ARIN)
- ★ LIR / ISP Tools for certificate management
- ★ Testing, Testing, Testing
- ★ Operational service profile specification

Working notes and related material we've been working on in this trial activity:


<http://mirin.apnic.net/resourcecerts>

Focus points for Q1 2007

- Can we design the certificate management subsystem to be an largely automated “slave” of the resource allocation function?
- Provide a toolset to allow IRs to manage certificate issuance
- Use the same toolset to provide “hosted” certificate services

Focus points for Q1 2007

- Defining the components and interactions of a “certificate engine”



Focus points for Q1 2007

- Automated certificate issuance
 - Query / Response interaction between registry and registry clients:
 - **List:** What resources have been allocated to me and what's the corresponding state of issued certificates?
 - **Issue:** Here is a certificate request – please issue me with a certificate that matches my allocated resource set
 - **Remove:** Please revoke certificates issued with this public key

Next Steps

- Development of the Certificate Engine
- End Entity Certificates
- Tools for Relying Parties
- Evaluation of Progress

Thank You

<http://mirin.apnic.net/resourcecerts>

Questions?