


# Rolling the Root


Geoff Huston  
APNIC Labs

# Use of DNSSEC in Today's Internet



# Use of DNSSEC in North America

## Use of DNSSEC Validation for Northern America (XQ)



**Why is this relevant?**

# Because...

the root zone managers are preparing to roll the  
DNS Root Zone Key Signing Key  
(and this may break your DNS service!)

# Five Years Ago...



ars technica UNLOCK THE WORLD\*  
\*Ouvre le monde

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## RISK ASSESSMENT / SECURITY & HACKTIVISM

### DNS root zone finally signed, but security battle not over

The root of the DNS hierarchy is now protected with a cryptographic signature ...

by Iljitsch van Beijnum - Jul 16, 2010 11:28pm CEST

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Yesterday, the DNS root zone was signed. This is an important step in the deployment of DNSSEC, the mechanism that will finally secure the DNS against manipulation by malicious third parties.

## ICANN's First DNSSEC Key Ceremony for the Root Zone

in f t g+ e +

The global deployment of Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) will achieve an important milestone on June 16, 2010 as ICANN hosts the first production DNSSEC key ceremony in a high security data centre in Culpeper, VA, outside of Washington, DC.



## Schneier on Security

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← [Pork-Filled Counter-Islamic Bomb Device](#)

[Security Vulnerabilities of Smart Electricity Meters](#) →

### DNSSEC Root Key Split Among Seven People

The DNSSEC root key has been [divided](#) among seven people:

Part of ICANN's security scheme is the Domain Name System Security, a security protocol that ensures Web sites are registered and "signed" (this is the security measure built into the Web that ensures when you go to a URL you arrive at a real site and not an identical pirate site). Most major servers are a part of DNSSEC, as it's known, and during a major international attack, the system might sever connections between important servers to contain the damage.

, VA - location of first DNSSEC key signing ceremony

# Five Years Ago...

Root DNSSEC Design Team

F. Ljunggren  
Kirei  
T. Okubo  
VeriSign  
R. Lamb  
ICANN  
J. Schlyter  
Kirei  
May 21, 2010

## DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK Operator

### Abstract

This document is the DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) for the Root Zone Key Signing Key (KSK) Operator. It states the practices and provisions that are used to provide Root Zone Key Signing and Key Distribution services. These include, but are not limited to: issuing, managing, changing and distributing DNS keys in accordance with the specific requirements of the U.S. Department of Commerce.

Root Zone KSK Operator DPS

May 2010

### 6.3. Signature format

The cryptographic hash function used in conjunction with the signing algorithm is required to be sufficiently resistant to preimage attacks during the time in which the signature is valid.

The RZ KSK signatures will be generated by encrypting SHA-256 hashes using RSA [RFC5702].

### 6.4. Zone signing key roll-over

ZSK rollover is carried out quarterly automatically by the Root Zone ZSK Operator's system as described in the Root Zone ZSK Operator's DPS.

### 6.5. Key signing key roll-over

Each RZ KSK will be scheduled to be rolled over through a key ceremony as required, or after 5 years of operation.

RZ KSK roll-over is scheduled to facilitate automatic updates of resolvers' Trust Anchors as described in RFC 5011 [RFC5011].

After a RZ KSK has been removed from the key set, it will be retained after its operational period until the next scheduled key ceremony, when the private component will be destroyed in accordance with section 5.2.10.

# Five Years Ago...

Root DNSSEC Design Team

F. Ljunggren  
Kirei  
T. Okubo  
VeriSign  
R. Lamb  
ICANN  
J. Schlyter  
Kirei  
May 21, 2010

## DNSSEC Practice Statement for the Root Zone KSK Operator

### Abstract

This document is the DNSSEC Practice Statement (DPS) for the Root Zone Key Signing Key (KSK) and Key Signing Key (KSK) provisions. It describes the distribution, issuance, and management of the Root Zone KSK with the signing ceremony.

May 2010

### 6.3. Signature

The cryptographic algorithm used for signing is RSA. Attacks due to the use of RSA are mitigated by using a 6 hash function.

signing  
age

### 6.4. Zone signing

The Root Zone KSK rollover is managed by the Root Zone KSK Operator's DPS.

6 hashes

oot Zone  
ator's

### 6.5. Key signing

Each RZ KSK will be scheduled to be rolled over through a key ceremony as required, or after 5 years of operation.

RZ KSK roll-over is scheduled to facilitate automatic updates of resolvers' Trust Anchors as described in RFC 5011 [RFC5011].

After a RZ KSK has been removed from the key set, it will be retained after its operational period until the next scheduled key ceremony, when the private component will be destroyed in accordance with section 5.2.10.



# ZSK?

- Zone Signing Key
- Used to generate the digital signature RRSIG records in the root zone
- The ZSK is rolled regularly every quarter
- The DNSKEY record for the ZSK is signed by the KSK

# KSK?

- The Root Zone Key Signing Key signs the DNSKEY RR set of the root zone
  - The Zone Signing Key (ZSK) signs the individual root zone entries
- The KSK Public Key is used as the DNSSEC Validation trust anchor
  - It is copied everywhere as “configuration data”
  - Most of the time the KSK is kept offline in highly secure facilities

# The Eastern KSK Repository



Secure data center in Culpeper, VA - location of first DNSSEC key signing ceremony

# The Western KSK Repository



El Segundo, California \*

# The Ultra Secret Third KSK Repository in Amsterdam



KSK spotting by George Michaelson

# The Uruguay Mobile KSK



KSK spotting by George Michaelson

# The Cast of Actors

- Root Zone Management Partners:
  - Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
  - National Telecommunications and Information Administration, US Department of Commerce (NTIA)
  - Verisign
- External Design Team for KSK Roll

# **Approach**

- ICANN Public Consultation – 2012
- Detailed Engineering Study - 2013
- SSAC Study (SAC-063) - 2013
- KSK Roll Design Team - 2015



# 2015 Design Team Milestones

- January – June:  
Study, discuss, measure, ponder, discuss some more
- August
  - Present a draft report for ICANN Public Comment  
<https://www.icann.org/public-comments/root-ksk-2015-08-06-en>  
(comment close 5<sup>th</sup> October 2015)
- October
  - Prepare final report
- Pass to the Root Zone Management Partners who then will develop an operational plan and execute


# Rolling the KSK?

- All DNS resolvers that perform validation of DNS responses use a local copy of the KSK
- They will need to load a new KSK public key and replace the existing trust anchor with this new value at the appropriate time
- This key roll could have a public impact, particularly if DNSSEC-validating resolvers do not load the new KSK


# Easy, Right?

- Publish a new KSK and include it in DNSKEY responses
- Use the new KSK to sign the ZSK, as well as the old KSK signature
  - Resolvers use old-signs-over-new to pick up the new KSK, validate it using the old KSK, and replace the local trust anchor material with the new KSK
- Withdraw the old signature signed via the old KSK
- Revoke the old KSK

# The RFC5011 Approach



# The RFC5011 Approach



# Just Like Last Time?

## Roll Over and Die?

February 2010

**George Michaelson  
Patrik Wallström  
Roy Arends  
Geoff Huston**

In this month's column I have the pleasure of being joined by George Michaelson, Patrik Wallström and Roy Arends to present some critical results following recent investigations on the behaviour of DNS resolvers with DNSSEC. It's a little longer than usual, but I trust that its well worth the read.

-- Geoff

It is considered good security practice to treat cryptographic keys with a healthy level of respect. The conventional wisdom appears to be that the more material you sign with a given private key the more clues you are leaving behind that could enable some form of effective key guessing. As RFC4641 states: "the longer a key is in use, the greater the probability that it will have been compromised through carelessness, accident, espionage, or cryptanalysis." Even though the risk is considered slight if you have chosen to use a decent key length, RFC 4641 recommends, as good operational practice, that you should "roll" your key at regular intervals. Evidently it's a popular view that fresh keys are better keys!

The standard practice for a "staged" key rollover is to generate a new key pair, and then have the two public keys co-exist at the publication point for a period of time, allowing relying parties, or clients, some period of time to pick up the new public key part. Where possible during this period, signing is performed twice, once with each key, so that the validation test can be performed using either key. After an appropriate interval of parallel operation the old key pair can be deprecated and the new key can be used for signing.

This practice of staged rollover as part of key management is used in X.509 certificates, and is also used in signing the DNS, using DNSSEC. A zone operator who wants to roll the DNSSEC key value would provide notice of a pending key change, publish the public key part of a new key pair, and then use the new and old private keys in parallel for a period. On the face of it, this process sounds quite straightforward.

What could possibly go wrong?

# But that was then...

And this is now:

- Resolvers are now not so aggressive in searching for alternate validation paths when validation fails  
(as long as resolvers keep their code up to date, which everyone does – right?)
- And now we **all** support RFC5011 key roll processes
- And **everyone** can cope with large DNS responses

So all this will go without a hitch

Nobody will even notice the KSK roll at the root

Truly ruly!

# But that was then...

And this is now:

- Resolvers are now not so aggressive in searching for alternate validation paths when validation fails

(as long as resolvers keep their code up to date, which everyone does)

- And now we have a KSK roll process
- And **everyone** has a KSK roll process

So all this will go well

Nobody will even notice the KSK roll at the root

Truly Truly!

**Not!**



# What we all should be concerned about...

That resolvers who validate DNS responses will fail to pick up the new DNS root key automatically

- i.e. they do not have code that follows RFC5011 procedures for the introduction of a new KSK

The resolvers will be unable to receive the larger DNS responses that will occur during the dual signature phase of the rollover

# Technical Concerns

- Some DNSSEC validating resolvers do not support RFC5011
  - How many resolvers may be affected in this way?
  - How many users may be affected?
  - What will the resolvers do when validation fails?
    - Will they perform lookup ‘thrashing’
  - What will users do when resolvers return SERVFAIL?
    - How many users will redirect their query to a non-validating resolver

# Technical Concerns

- Some DNSSEC validating resolvers do not support RFC5011
  - How many resolvers may be affected?
  - How many users are affected?
  - How many users will be affected when resolvers return SERVFAIL?
  - How many users will redirect their query to a non-validating resolver?

*Really hard to test this in the wild with recursive resolvers*

# Some Observations - 1

There is a LOT of DNSSEC validation out there

- 87% of all queries have DNSSEC-OK set
- 30% of all DNSSEC-OK queries attempt to validate the response
- 25% of end users are using DNS resolvers that will validate what they are told
- 12% of end users don't believe bad validation news and turn to other non-validating resolvers when validation fails.

# Some Observations - 2

There is very little V6 being used out there

- 1% of queries use IPv6 as the transport protocol when given a dual stack name server

It seems that when given a choice:

Browsers prefer IPv6

Resolvers prefer IPv4

# Some Observations - 3

ECDSA is viable – sort of

- 1 in 5 clients who use resolvers that validate RSA-signed responses are unable to validate the same response when signed using ECDSA
- But they fail to “unsigned” rather than “invalid” so it’s a (sort of) safe fail

# Some Observations - 4

The larger DNS responses will probably work

- The “fall back to TCP” will rise to 6% of queries when the response size get to around 1,350 octets
- And the DNS failure rate appears to rise by around 1 - 2 %
- BUT .org currently runs at 1,650 octets and nobody is screaming failure
- So it will probably work

# Some Observations - 5

We can't measure automated key take up

- We can't see how many resolvers fail to use RFC5011 notices to pick up the new KSK as a Trust Anchor in advance
- We will only see it via failure on key roll



# Where are we?

- A key roll of the Root Zone KSK will cause some resolvers to fail:
  - Resolvers who do not pick up the new key in the manner described by RFC5011
  - Resolvers who cannot receive a DNS response of ~1,300 octets
- Many users who use these failing resolvers will just switch over to use a non-validating resolver
- A small pool of users will be affected with no DNS

# Now?

Public comment:

draft report for ICANN Public Comment

<https://www.icann.org/public-comments/root-ksk-2015-08-06-en>

Comments close 5<sup>th</sup> October 2015

Please read & comment

# What can I do?

Check your recursive resolver config!

# Good Dog!

```
# // recursive resolver configuration - Bind
...
managed-keys {
    . initial-key 257 3 5 "AwEAAfdqNV
      JMRMzrppU1WnNW0PWrGn4x9dPg
...
    =,,i }i
```

# Bad Dog!

```
# // recursive resolver configuration - Bind
...
trusted-keys {
    . 257 3 5 "AwEAAfdqNV
        JMRMzrppU1WnNW0PWrGn4x9dPg
...
    =,,i }i
```

**Questions?**

# Comments - 1

## Why Now?

What is the imperative to roll the key now? Could we use more time to improve preparedness for this roll? For example, could we use further time to introduce some explicit EDNS(0) signalling options in resolvers to expose RFC5011 capability?

# Comments - 2

## Measuring and Testing?

What measurements are planned to be undertaking during the key roll process? What are the threshold metrics for proceeding to the next phase? What is the threshold metric to proceed with the revocation of the old KSK?



# Comments - 3

## Algorithm Change

The report's language around the potential for algorithm change is unclear. There appears to be a strong bias to retention of RSA as the KSK algorithm, despite evidence that ECDSA is both shorter and potentially faster to compute. Whilst the report argues for a reduced risk of large packets, it doesn't clearly explain why larger RSA-based DNS response payloads would be preferable to smaller ECDSA DNS response payloads.

# Comments - 4

## Scheduling

The report notes as a constraint that a key roll must be aligned with existing Quarter and 10-day periods used in existing processes. This has the potential consequence of scheduling the critical change in the root zone on a weekend, or on a major public holiday. Why?

# Comments - 5

## Serialization

The report assumes a single new KSK. What are the issues of introducing 2 or even 3 new KSKs at this point?

# Comments - 6

## All together all at once?

Why do all root zones flip to use the new KSK all at the same time?

Why is there not a period of dual sigs over the root ZSK?

Why not allow each root server to switch from old to old+new to new using a staggered timetable?

There may be perfectly sound reasons why all together all at once is a better option than staggered introduction, but report does not appear to provide any such reasons.