# An Operational Perspective on Routing Security

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### On the Internet...

### there are many ways to be bad!



### there are many ways to be bad!

Enlist a bot army and mount multi-gigabit DOS attacks

Extortion leverage and general mayhem

Port Scan for known exploits
 General annoyance

Spew spam

Yes, there are still gullible folk out there!

Mount a fake web site attack

And lure victims

Mount a routing attack

And bring down an entire region / country / global network!



# If I were bad (and greedy)...

### I'd attack routing.

- Through routing I'd attack the DNS
- Through the DNS I'd lure traffic through an interceptor web server
- And be able to quietly collect users' details

Welcome to today's online fraud industry



# If I were really bad (and evil)...

### I'd attack routing.

- Through routing I'd attack:
  - the route registry server system
  - the DNS root system
  - trust anchors for TLS and browser certificates
  - isolate critical public servers and resources
  - overwhelm the routing system with spurious information

And bring selected parts of the network to a complete chaotic halt!





80.00 70.00 60.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00

availability of YouTube.com dropping dramatically from 100 percent to 0 hour. It didn't recover completely until two hours had elapsed.

A high-profile incident this weekend in which Pakistan's state-owned telecommunications company man global Web highlights a long-standing security weakness in the way the Internet is managed.

After receiving a censorship order from the telecommunications ministry directing that YouTube.com went even further. By accident or design, the company broadcast instructions worldwide claiming to b anyone trying to reach YouTube's range of Internet addresses.

The security weakness lies in why those false instructions, which took YouTube offline for two hours of routers around the globe. That's because Hong Kong-based PCCW, which provides the Internet link to the misleading broadcast-which is what most large providers in the United States and Europe do.

This is not a new problem. A network provider in Turkey once pretended to be the entire Internet, snarf Web sites unreachable. Con Edison accidentally hijacked the Internet addresses for Panix customers Omnimedia and the New York Daily News. Problems with errant broadcasts go back as far as 1997.

It's also not an infrequent problem. An automatically-updated list of suspicious broadcasts created by



#### Pakistan lifts the ban on YouTube

Pakistan's telecoms regulator has lifted the restrictions it imposed on video-sharing website YouTube. Politics

England

Scotland

Business

Education

Technology

Science/Nature

Entertainment

Have Your Say

Country Profiles

Special Reports

ON THIS DAY

EDITORS' BLOG

Magazine

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Wales

Health

The Pakistan Telecommunication Authority has told internet service providers (ISPs) to restore access to the site. according to a spokeswoman.

Google, the owner of YouTube, confirmed service had been Also in the news restored in Pakistan. Video and Audio

The attempt to block the site, reportedly because of a

Turkey and Thailand have in the

past also banned across to the site.

"blasphemous" video clip, caused a near global blackout of the

A spokesman for YouTube told the BBC News website: "We are pleased to confirm that YouTube is again accessible in Pakistan."

It is reported that a trailer for a forthcoming film by Dutch

RELATED BBC SITES lawmaker Geert Wilders, which portrays Islam in a negative light, SPORT was behind the restrictions. WEATHER CBBC NEWSROUND The ban wa

The block on the servers was lifted once PCCW had been told of the issue by YouTube engineers.

A statement from Google said that the problems lasted for "about two hours".

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- Pakistan blocks YouTube website 24 Feb 08 | South Asia
- Should governments block
- websites?
- 25 Feb 08 | Middle East ▶ Thai han on YouTube website
- 31 Aug 07 | Asia-Pacific
- YouTube site 'blocked' in Morocco 29 May 07 L Africa
- → Turkish court bans YouTube access 07 Mar 07 | Europe

#### RELATED INTERNET LINKS

The BBC is not responsible for the content of external internet sites.

#### TOP TECHNOLOGY STORIES

▶ Wiki boss 'edited for donation

66 The fact YouTube is back in action makes me revise my thoughts on the clash between governments and freedom of speech

Rory Cellan-Jones

"Traffic to YouTube was routed Read Rory's blog

protocols, and many users around the world could not access our site " it said

A leading net professional told BBC News: "This was probably a simple mistake by an engineer at Pakistan Telecom. There's nothing to suggest this was malicious.'

s unique address by corrupting the internet's routing tables, which direct the flow of data around the world.

### Some recent cases ...

### 208.65.153.0/24 originated by AS17557

Advertisement of a more specific route by Pakistan Telecom that managed to take YouTube off the air in February 2008

### 61.0.0.0/8 originated by AS4678


Advertisement of a more general route by a spammer in order to conceal their identity by using an anonymous source ip address, occurring intermittently 2004 – 2007

### d000::/8 originated by AS28716

Advertisement of a massive bogon more general route in IPV6 from 13 Nov 2009 until 15 Jan 2010 – and noone noticed for 2 months!

# How many advertisements in today's BGP are "lies"?

### www.cidr-report.org





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		CID	R Report		
		HELLONET-AS-KR CJ-CABLENET	192.145.231.0 - 192		
192.153.144.0/21 192.154.32.0/19		DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center NCREN - MCNC	192.153.147.0 - 192 192.154.59.0 - 192.1		
192.154.64.0/19		NCREN - MCNC	192.154.80.0 - 192.1		
		DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	192.188.223.0 - 192		
		LINKdotNET-AS	196.2.224.0 - 196.2.		
	AS5713	SAIX-NET	196.6.103.0 - 196.6.		
196.13.201.0/24		TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.1		
196.13.202.0/24 196.13.203.0/24		TENET-1 TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.1 196.13.201.0 - 196.1		
196.13.203.0/24		TENET-1	196.13.201.0 - 196.1		
196.202.224.0/21		TELE Greenland Autonomous System	196.202.224.0 - 196		
	AS4761	INDOSAT-INP-AP INDOSAT Internet Network Provider	198.0.0.0 - 198.1.7.2		
		VZUNET - Verizon Data Services LLC	198.23.26.0 - 198.23		
		ACI-1 - Accelerated Connections Inc.	198.73.209.0 - 198.7		
		DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	198.97.77.0 - 198.97		
		DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	198.97.102.0 - 198.9 198.97.241.0 - 198.9		
198.135.236.0/24		XNET - XNet Information Systems, Inc.	198.97.241.0 - 198.5		
198.161.82.0/23		ALLST-15290 - Allstream Corp.	198.161.83.0 - 198.1		
198.161.87.0/24	AS6539	GT-BELL - Bell Canada	198.161.87.0 - 198.1	61.87.255	
198.161.92.0/24		GT-BELL - Bell Canada	198.161.92.0 - 198.1		
198.163.214.0/24		ACCESS-SK - Access Communications Co-operative Limited	198.163.214.0 - 198		
198.163.215.0/24 198.163.216.0/24		SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc. SHAW - Shaw Communications Inc.	198.163.214.0 - 198 198.163.214.0 - 198		
	AS7456	INTERHOP - Interhop Network SERVICES Inc.	198.167.0.0 - 198.16		
	AS701	UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	198.167.255.0 - 198		
	AS803	SASKTEL - Saskatchewan Telecommunications	198.169.10.0 - 198.1		
198.180.198.0/24		SEOUL-INTGW-GXS-AP Global Exchange Services	198.180.198.0 - 198		
198.182.235.0/24		LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications	198.182.235.0 - 198		
	AS27064 AS6389	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc.	199.10.4.0 - 199.10. 199.16.31.0 - 199.16		
199.26.183.0/24		UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	199.26.183.0 - 199.2		
199.114.128.0/18		DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.130.0/24	AS6045	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199	.114.203.255	
199.114.131.0/24		DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.132.0/24		DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.136.0/24 199.114.138.0/24		DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199 199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.140.0/24		ITSDN-U7 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.142.0/24		DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199	.114.203.255	
199.114.144.0/24	AS6045	DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199	.114.203.255	
199.114.148.0/24		DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.150.0/24		DNIC-ASBLK-05800-06055 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.152.0/24 199.114.153.0/24		DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.114.129.0 - 199 199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.154.0/24		CENTAF-SWA - 754th Electronic Systems Group	199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.156.0/24		CENTAF-SWA - 754th Electronic Systems Group	199.114.129.0 - 199		
199.114.160.0/24	AS1733	CENTAF-SWA - 754th Electronic Systems Group	199.114.129.0 - 199	.114.203.255	
	AS27064	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.120.255.0 - 199	.121.3.255	
	AS27064	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.123.0.0 - 199.12		
199.123.16.0/20 199.123.80.0/21	AS27064 AS27064	DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center DNIC-ASBLK-27032-27159 - DoD Network Information Center	199.123.30.0 - 199.1 199.123.83.0 - 199.1		
199.185.130.0/23		UNISERVE-ONLINE - Uniserve On Line	199.125.65.0 - 199.1		
	AS701	UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	199.201.255.0 - 199		
199.202.216.0/21	AS577	BACOM - Bell Canada	199.202.216.0 - 199	.202.223.255	
199.233.92.0/24	AS26896	D102-ITC - Data 102, LLC	199.233.92.0 - 199.2	33.92.255	
199.246.116.0/24		UUNET-CANADA - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	199.246.116.0 - 199		
	AS29754	GO2TEL GO2TEL.COM INC.	200.1.112.0 - 200.1.		
200.108.176.0/20 202.6.176.0/20	AS14551 AS24316	UUNET-SA - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	200.108.144.0 - 200 202.6.176.0 - 202.6.		
	AS24310 AS2764	AAPT AAPT Limited	202.9.51.0 - 202.9.5	5.255	
	AS2764	AAPT AAPT Limited	202.9.57.0 - 202.9.9	5.255	




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	AS19161		202.58.112.0 - 202.58.115.255	
202.61.72.0/24 202.61.73.0/24	AS9425	CONCENTRIX-PH-AS-AP Concentrix Technologies, Inc	202.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255 202.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255	
202.61.75.0/24	AS9425 AS9927	CONCENTRIX-PH-AS-AP Concentrix Technologies, Inc PHILCOMNET-PH A Multihomed ISP Company	202.61.64.0 - 202.61.127.255	
	AS9584	GENESIS-AP Divixian.com Limited	202.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255	
202.66.184.0/24	AS9584	GENESIS-AP Diyixian.com Limited	202.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255	
	AS9584	GENESIS-AP Diyixian.com Limited	202.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255	
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	AS9584 AS9584	GENESIS-AP Diyixian.com Limited GENESIS-AP Diyixian.com Limited	202.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255 202.66.128.0 - 202.66.191.255	
	AS4788	TMNET-AS-AP TM Net, Internet Service Provider	202.73.144.0 - 202.73.159.255	
	AS9519	VERTELNET Vertical Telecoms Pty Ltd	202.79.224.0 - 202.79.231.255	
202.80.192.0/20	AS2706	PI-HK Pacnet Internet (Hong Kong) Limited	202.80.196.0 - 202.80.207.255	
	AS4748	RESOLINK-AS-AP Resources Link Network Limited	202.86.252.0 - 202.86.255.255	
	AS9304	HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications	202.86.252.0 - 202.86.255.255	
	AS9304 AS9304	HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications HUTCHISON-AS-AP Hutchison Global Communications	202.86.252.0 - 202.86.255.255	
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	AS17557	PKTELECOM-AS-PK Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited	202.87.80.0 - 202.87.127.255	
202.94.1.0/24	AS4808	CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network	202.94.0.0 - 202.94.31.255	
202.125.113.0/24		CYBERNET-AP Cyber Internet Services (Pvt) Ltd.	202.125.80.0 - 202.125.127.255	
202.125.114.0/24		CYBERNET-AP Cyber Internet Services (Pvt) Ltd.	202.125.80.0 - 202.125.127.255	
202.125.115.0/24		CYBERNET-AP Cyber Internet Services (Pvt) Ltd.	202.125.80.0 - 202.125.127.255	
202.133.37.0/24		PKTELECOM-AS-PK Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited WORLDCALL-AS-KHI Worldcall Telecom Limited	202.133.32.0 - 202.133.47.255 202.133.64.0 - 202.133.79.255	
202.133.73.0/24		WORLDCALL-AS-KHI Worldcall Telecom Limited	202.133.64.0 - 202.133.79.255	
202.136.254.0/24		CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network	202.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255	
202.136.255.0/24		CHINA169-BJ CNCGROUP IP network China169 Beijing Province Network	202.136.252.0 - 202.136.255.255	
202.143.56.0/21		COMINDICO-AP SOUL Converged Communications Australia	202.143.56.0 - 202.143.63.255	
202.150.227.0/24		NAPINFO-AS-AP PT. NAP Info Lintas Nusa	202.150.224.0 - 202.150.255.255	
202.174.70.0/24 202.174.125.0/24		WIS Wind International Services SA BBIL-AP BHARTI Airtel Ltd.	202.174.64.0 - 202.174.79.255 202.174.124.0 - 202.174.127.255	
202.174.125.0/24		ASN-HKNET-AP HKNet Co. Ltd	202.181.32.0 - 202.181.63.255	
		NETSPACE-AS-AP Netspace Online Systems	203.12.45.0 - 203.12.45.255	
203.62.0.0/17	AS7575	AARNET-AS-AP Australian Academic and Reasearch Network (AARNet)	203.62.2.0 - 203.62.2.255	
203.78.48.0/20		IPG-AS-AP Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company	203.78.48.0 - 203.78.63.255	
203.80.136.0/21		EVOSERVE-AS-AP EvoServe is a content and online access Internet provider company	203.80.132.0 - 203.80.143.255	
203.112.111.0/24 203.112.113.0/24		OPTUSCOM-AS01-AU SingTel Optus Pty Ltd OPTUSCOM-AS01-AU SingTel Optus Pty Ltd	203.112.96.0 - 203.112.127.255 203.112.96.0 - 203.112.127.255	
203.112.114.0/24		ASN-IINET iiNet Limited	203.112.96.0 - 203.112.127.255	
203.112.116.0/24		OPTUSCOM-AS01-AU SingTel Optus Pty Ltd	203.112.96.0 - 203.112.127.255	
203.112.117.0/24	AS7474	OPTUSCOM-AS01-AU SingTel Optus Pty Ltd	203.112.96.0 - 203.112.127.255	
203.112.118.0/24		OPTUSCOM-AS01-AU SingTel Optus Pty Ltd	203.112.96.0 - 203.112.127.255	
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203.112.127.0/24		OPTUSCOM-AS01-AU SingTel Optus Pty Ltd	203.112.96.0 - 203.112.127.255	
203.128.128.0/24		CNNIC-NET263-AP Beijing Capital-online science development Co.,Ltd.	203.128.128.0 - 203.128.159.255	
203.142.219.0/24	AS45149		203.142.219.0 - 203.142.219.255	
203.189.96.0/20		PKTELECOM-AS-PK Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited	203.189.96.0 - 203.189.111.255	
204.9.216.0/23	AS6389	BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc.	204.9.216.0 - 204.9.219.255	
204.9.218.0/23 204.15.168.0/21	AS6389 AS46753	BELLSOUTH-NET-BLK - BellSouth.net Inc. TDAMERITRADETRUST - TD Ameritrade Trust	204.9.216.0 - 204.9.219.255 204.15.168.0 - 204.15.175.255	
	AS46753 AS46753	TDAMERITRADETRUST - TD Ameritrade Trust	204.15.168.0 - 204.15.175.255	
204.19.14.0/23	AS577	BACOM - Bell Canada	204.19.15.0 - 204.19.15.255	
204.89.214.0/24	AS4323	TWTC - tw telecom holdings, inc.	204.89.214.0 - 204.89.214.255	
	AS3356	LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications	204.197.128.0 - 204.197.255.255	
204.209.114.0/24		PEER1 - Peer 1 Network Inc.	204.209.114.0 - 204.209.114.255	
205.150.0.0/15		UUNET - MCI Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Verizon Business	205.151.0.0 - 205.151.0.255	
		CYBERSURF - Cybersurf Inc. CYBERSURF - Cybersurf Inc.	205.189.134.0 - 205.189.134.255 205.210.145.0 - 205.210.145.255	
206.108.96.0/19		BACOM - Bell Canada	206.108.114.0 - 206.108.115.255	
206.128.104.0/21	AS11709	VIC - VIRTUAL INTERACTIVE CENTER	206.128.96.0 - 206.128.111.255	
206.180.240.0/20	AS12083	KNOLOGY-NET - Knology Holdings	206.180.240.0 - 206.180.255.255	


## yes, there's more

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207.174.0.0/16 AS13790 207.174.131.0/24 AS26116	INTERNAP-BLK3 - Internap Network Services Corporation		207.174.128.0 - 207.174.129.255 207.174.131.0 - 207.174.136.255			
207.174.131.0/24 AS26116 207.174.132.0/23 AS26116			207.174.131.0 - 207.174.136.255			
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207.174.182.0/24 AS29831 207.174.188.0/24 AS26116			207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255 207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
207.174.189.0/24 AS26116			207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
207.174.190.0/24 AS26116	INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
207.174.191.0/24 AS26116	INDRA - Indra's Net Inc.		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
207.174.192.0/24 AS29831	FONENET - FONE NET, LLC		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255			
207.174.200.0/24 AS22658 207.174.248.0/21 AS6653	EARTHNET - Earthnet, Inc. PRIVATEI - privateI, LLC		207.174.176.0 - 207.174.200.255 207.174.212.0 - 207.174.255.255			
207.231.96.0/19 AS11194			207.231.104.0 - 207.231.111.255			
208.73.4.0/22 AS27630	PREMIER - Premier Innovations, LLC		208.73.4.0 - 208.73.7.255			
208.77.224.0/22 AS174	COGENT Cogent/PSI		208.77.224.0 - 208.77.231.255			
208.77.229.0/24 AS174 208.77.230.0/23 AS174	COGENT Cogent/PSI COGENT Cogent/PSI		208.77.224.0 - 208.77.231.255 208.77.224.0 - 208.77.231.255			
208.78.164.0/24 AS16565			208.78.164.0 - 208.78.167.255			
208.78.165.0/24 AS16565			208.78.164.0 - 208.78.167.255			
208.78.167.0/24 AS16565			208.78.164.0 - 208.78.167.255			
209.54.123.0/24 AS6062 209.87.208.0/24 AS31997	NETPLEX - NETPLEX		209.54.0.0 - 209.54.255.255 209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.208.0/24 AS31997 209.87.209.0/24 AS31997			209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.210.0/24 AS31997			209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.211.0/24 AS31997			209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.212.0/22 AS31997 209.87.216.0/24 AS31997			209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
209.87.216.0/24 AS31997 209.87.217.0/24 AS31997			209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255 209.87.208.0 - 209.87.223.255			
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209.105.224.0/19 AS20074			209.105.224.0 - 209.105.255.255			
209.140.90.0/24 AS14461			209.140.0.0 - 209.141.255.255			
209.141.48.0/22 AS14461			209.140.0.0 - 209.141.255.255			
209.213.0.0/20 AS33005 209.213.1.0/24 AS7849	ELTOPIA - Eltopia.com, LLC CROCKERCOM - CROCKER COMMUNICATIONS		209.213.0.0 - 209.213.15.255 209.213.0.0 - 209.213.15.255			
209.213.4.0/24 AS7849	CROCKERCOM - CROCKER COMMUNICATIONS		209.213.0.0 - 209.213.15.255			
210.5.128.0/20 AS4837	CHINA169-BACKBONE CNCGROUP China169 Backbone		210.5.128.0 - 210.5.143.255			
210.56.150.0/23 AS38138		)	210.56.144.0 - 210.56.151.255			
210.247.224.0/19 AS7496 216.21.192.0/20 AS14697	WEBCENTRAL-AS WebCentral VDOTNET - VDot.Net		210.247.240.0 - 210.247.255.255 216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255			
216.21.192.0/20 AS1469/ 216.21.196.0/24 AS12251			216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255			
216.21.201.0/24 AS12251	INVISION - Invision.com, Inc.		216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255			
216.21.202.0/24 AS12251	INVISION - Invision.com, Inc.		216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255			
216.21.206.0/23 AS12251			216.21.192.0 - 216.21.207.255			
216.58.192.0/24 AS22702 216.58.197.0/24 AS22702			216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255 216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255			
216.58.200.0/24 AS18530			216.58.192.0 - 216.58.223.255			
216.99.20.0/24 AS3356	LEVEL3 Level 3 Communications		216.99.16.0 - 216.99.23.255			
216.144.240.0/23 AS11351			216.144.240.0 - 216.144.255.255			
216.144.243.0/24 AS11351 216.144.244.0/22 AS11351			216.144.240.0 - 216.144.255.255 216.144.240.0 - 216.144.255.255			
216.163.144.0/20 AS35985			216.163.144.0 - 216.163.159.255			
216.172.198.0/24 AS22773	ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc.		216.172.0.0 - 216.172.255.255			
216.172.199.0/24 AS22773	ASN-CXA-ALL-CCI-22773-RDC - Cox Communications Inc.		216.172.0.0 - 216.172.255.255			
216.243.240.0/20 AS12182			216.243.240.0 - 216.243.255.255			
216.250.112.0/20 AS7296 216.250.116.0/24 AS36066	ALCHEMYNET - Alchemy Communications, Inc. UNI-MARKETING-ALLIANCE - Webhost4life.com		216.250.112.0 - 216.250.127.255 216.250.112.0 - 216.250.127.255			
216.251.207.0/24 AS1239	SPRINTLINK - Sprint		216.251.192.0 - 216.251.207.255			


## getting the point yet?




### still more!




### wake me up when we're done




### ZZZZZZZ



### almost done ...







# What's the base problem here?

Noone seems to want to care enough about the integrity of the network to address routing integrity!

# Today's Routing Environment is Insecure

- Routing is built on sloppy mutual trust models
- Routing auditing is a low value activity that noone performs with any level of thoroughness
- We have grown used to lousy solutions and institutionalized lying in the routing system

# Routing is a shared problem

### It's a "tragedy of the commons" situation:

- Nobody can single-handedly apply rigorous tests on the routing system
- And the lowest common denominator approach that everyone can apply is to apply no integrity tests at all

# But we <u>need</u> better routing security - don't we?

- But what does this "need" mean beyond various mantras, noble intentions and vague generalities about public safety and benefit?
  - Who wants to pay for decent security?
  - What's the business drivers for effective security?
  - How do you avoid diversions into security pantomimes and functionless veneers?

Can you make effective security a preferred atternative?

### Risk Management

- Adding operational security measures is <u>not</u> about being able to create and maintain absolute security. Its about a pragmatic approach to <u>risk mitigation</u>, using a trade-off between cost, complexity, flexibility and outcomes
- Its about making an informed and reasoned judgment to spend a certain amount of resources in order to achieve an acceptable risk outcome

### Threat Model

### Understanding routing threats:

- What might happen?
- What are the likely consequences?
- What's my liability here?
- How can the consequences be mitigated?
- What's the set of cost tradeoffs?
- Does the threat and its consequences justify the cost of implementing a specific security response?

### Threats

- Corrupting the routers' forwarding tables can result in:
  - Misdirecting traffic (subversion, denial of service, third party inspection, passing off)
  - Dropping traffic (denial of service, compound attacks)
  - Adding false addresses into the routing system (support compound attacks)
  - Isolating or removing the router from the network
- The beauty of a routing attack is that you don't need to corrupt the victim's system – indeed you are relying on the victim's system running correctly!

# Collective vs Unilateral Response

- Unilateral action has its limits in effectiveness
- Collective action is challenging
  - How much duplication of effort is entailed?
  - Is the threat a shared assessment?
  - Can we pool our resources and work together on a common threat model?
  - What tools do we need?
  - Are there beneficial externalities that are also generated?
  - What's the framework for collective action?

When will you stop asking all these bloody annoying stupid guestions and just tell me what to do!

## Things YOU can do

# Use a Robust Network Design

### Isolate your network at the edge:

- Route all traffic at the edge
- NO sharing LANs
- NO shared IGPs
- NO infrastructure tunnels

### Isolate your customers from each other:

NO shared access LANs

### Isolate routing roles within the network:

- Exterior-facing interface routers
- Internal core routers

### Protect your Routers

- Protecting routing infrastructure
  - ssh access to the routers
  - maintain filter lists
  - user account management
  - access log maintenance
  - snmp read / write access control lists
  - protect configurations
  - monitor configuration changes
- Protecting configuration control of routers is an essential part of network security

### Protect your BGP

#### Basic BGP configuration tasks:

- No redistribution from iBGP into the IGP
- Use session passwords and MD5 checksums to protect all BGP sessions
- For iBGP use the local loopback address as the nexthop (next-hop-self)
- Use filter lists to protect TCP port 179
- Use maximum prefix limiting (hold mode rather than session kill mode preferred)
- Use maximum as path limiting
- Use a silent recovery from mal-formed Updates
- Use eBGP multi-hop with care (and consider using TTL hack)
- Align route reflectors with topology to avoid iBGP traffic floods

#### Operating BGP:

- Use soft clear to prevent complete route withdrawals
- Use BGP session state and BGP update monitors and generate alarms on session instability and update floods

### Protect your BGP

- Check your router config with a current best practice configuration template
  - Rob Thomas' template at:
     <a href="http://www.team-cymru.org/ReadingRoom/Templates/secure-bgp-template.html">http://www.team-cymru.org/ReadingRoom/Templates/secure-bgp-template.html</a> is a good starting point

### Managing Routes

Take care of what you learn, because your peers and upstreams will trust you to have performed the appropriate checks before you advertise these routes

#### Always authenticate customer routing requests

Check validity of the address – route registries are your friend!

- Own space validate request against local route object registry
- Other space validate request against RIR route object database registered POC
  - This is often harder than it originally looks!

This does not prevent the deliberate lie, but it can catch the accidental typo

## Even so...

# After all this effort, its not all that good is it?

# Atternatively

Can we tweak BGP so that it can detect the difference between good and evil, and only advertise good routes?

#### A (random) BGP Update

2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:

nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561

3356 4657 4773

124.197.64.0/19

#### Routing Security

- The basic routing payload security questions that need to be answered are:
  - Who injected this address prefix into the network?
  - Did they have the necessary credentials to inject this address prefix? Is this a valid address prefix?
  - Is the forwarding path to reach this address prefix trustable?
- And can these questions be answered by any BGP speaker quickly and cheaply?

2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:

nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561

3356 4657 4773

124.197.64.0/19

- is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?

```
2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:
```

```
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561 3356 4657 4773
```

124.197.64.0/19

- is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?
- is AS4773 a "valid" ASN?

```
2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561
3356 4657 4773
124.197.64.0/19
```

- is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?
- is AS4773 a "valid" ASN?
- Is 4773 an "authorized AS to advertise a route to this prefix?

2010/01/26 00:03:35 rcvd UPDATE w/ attr:
nexthop 203.119.76.3, origin i, path 4608 1221 4637 3561 3356 4657 4773
124.197.64.0/19

- is 124.197.64.0/19 a "valid" prefix?
- is AS4773 a "valid" ASN?
- Is 4773 an "authorized AS to advertise a route to this prefix?
- Is the AS Path valid?
  - Is AS 4657 a valid AS, and did AS 4773 advertise this route to AS 4657?
  - Is AS 3356 a valid AS, and did AS 4657 advertise this route to AS 3356?
  - etc

#### A Foundation for Routing Security

- The use of authenticatable attestations to allow automated validation of:
  - the authenticity of the route object being advertised
  - authenticity of the origin AS
  - the binding of the origin AS to the route object
- Such attestations used to provide a cost effective method of validating routing requests
  - as compared to the today's state of the art based on techniques of vague trust and random whois data mining

### A Foundation for Routing Security

Adoption of some basic security functions into the Internet's routing domain:

- Injection of reliable trustable data
  - A Resource PKI as the base of validation of network data
- Explicit verifiable mechanisms for integrity of data distribution
   Adoption of some form of certified authorization mechanism to support validation of credentials associated with address and routing information

#### A Starting Point

- How can you certify who what which address?
  - follow the allocation trail
  - Certification of the "Right-of-Use" of IP Addresses and AS numbers as a linked attribute of the Internet's number resource allocation and distribution framework

#### For example:

APNIC (the "Issuer") certifies that:


the certificate "Subject"


whose public key is contained in the certificate


is the current holder of a set of IP address and AS resources


that are listed in the certificate extension


APNIC does NOT certify the identity of the subject, nor their good (or evil) intentions!














## What could you do with Resource Certificates?


- You could sign "routing authorities" with your private key, providing an authority for an AS to originate a route for the named prefix. Any Relying Party could validate this authority in the RPKI
- You could use the private key to sign routing information in an Internet Route Registry
- You could attach a digital signature to a protocol element in a routing protocol
- You could issue signed derivative certificates for any suballocations of resources

#### Signed Objects









Resource Allocation Hierarchy

AFRINIC

RIPE NCC

Route Origination Authority
"ISP4 permits AS65000 to
originate a route for the prefix
192.2.200.0/24"



Signed, ISP4 <isp4-ee-key-priv> %

#### **Validation Outcomes**

- 1. ISP4 authorized this Authority document
- 2. 192.2.200.0/24 is a **valid** address, derived from an APNIC allocation
- 3. ISP4 holds a current right-of-use of 192.2 200.0/24
- 4. A route object, where AS65000 originates an advertisement for the address prefix 192.2.200.0/24, has the explicit authority of ISP4, who is the current holder of this address prefix

#### A (partial) architecture for securing BGP origination **BGP** Local **BGP** Filter Speaker **RPKI** (Origin AS + processor prefix mask) Synchronization

Distributed RPKI Publication Repositories (Certificates and Routing Authorities)

# What about AS Path Validation?

It's complicated!

#### Progress

- Specifications submitted to the SIDR WG of the IETF:
  - Specification of a profile for Resource certificates
  - Specification of the distributed publication repository framework
  - Specification of the architecture of the RPKI
  - Specification of profiles for Route Origination Authorization objects (ROAs)
  - Specification of the Issuer / Subject resource certificate provisioning protocol

#### Progress

- Implementation Progress
  - Four independent implementation efforts for various aspects of the RPKI are underway at present
  - Tools for Resource Certificate management
    - Requests, Issuance, Revocation, Validation
  - Issuer / Subject certificate provisioning protocol
  - Functional RPKI Engine instance for an RIR integrated into MyAPNIC's production environment
  - Relying Party local cache management
  - RPKI validation tools

#### Intentions

- Create underlying framework for introducing route validation measures in BGP
- Assist ISP business process accuracy with Peering and Customer Configuration tool support
- Improve the integrity of published data through the signing and verification capability in Whois, IRR and similar

#### Concerns

- Will this work for securing BGP?
  - The major issue here is that of partial use and deployment
  - Any security mechanism has to cope with partial deployment
    - Which means that the basic conventional approach of "what is not certified and proved as good must be bad" will not work until everyone adopts this approach
    - This is a problem is the task of validation of origination
  - In BGP we need to think about both origination and the AS
     Path of a route object
    - And AS path validation is going to be very challenging indeed in an environment of piecemeal use of secure credentials
  - A partially secured environment may be more operationally expensive, but no more secure than what we have today

#### Concerns

- Is a trust hierarchy the best approach to use?
  - The concern here is concentration of vulnerability
    - If validation of routing information is dependant on the availability and validity of a single root trust anchor then what happens when this single digital artifact is attacked?
  - But can you successfully incorporate robust diversity into a supposedly secure trust framework?
    - This is challenging!

#### Concerns

- Is this the only way to achieve generally useful outcomes?
  - Is this form of augmentation to BGP to enforce "protocol payload correctness" over-engineered, and does it rely on impractical models of universal adoption?
  - Can routing anomaly detectors adequately detect the most prevalent forms of typos and deliberate lies in routing with a far lower overhead, and allow for unilateral detection of routing anomalies?

## Security only works in practice if:

we can make secure mechanisms cheaper, easier, more robust, and more effective than existing practices

#### Thank You

Questions?